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Strategic groups and strategic blocks offer alternative approaches to understanding patterns 
of intraindustry rivalry.  Strategic groups have traditionally been conceptualised in terms of 
scope and resource commitments, whereas strategic block theory clusters firms together on 
the basis of the density of interorganisational linkages.  This paper empirically tests the 
relative utility of the concepts of strategic groups and strategic blocks in the interpretation of 
patterns of rivalry across a number of international airline routes, ex-Australia.  The findings 
suggest that both conceptual tools offer insight into the patterns of rivalry evidenced in the 
industry, however the number of strategic groups present on each route served as the better 
predictor of the degree of rivalry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The ready acknowledgment that competition within industries is not homogeneous has 
prompted considerable research efforts to discern patterns of intraindustry rivalry.  One such 
sphere of this work has been the concept of strategic groups, which signify collections of 
firms within an industry that have in common resource and scope characteristics (Cool & 
Schendel, 1987).  This analytical construct has been utilised to investigate a variety of firm 
and industry specific concerns, including rivalry. 
 
To date, much of the research concerning the strategic group – rivalry relationship has been 
the empirical examination of the hypothesis posed by Caves and Porter (1977), that rivalry 
will be greater between firms from different strategic groups as opposed to firms within the 
same group.  Despite the relative longevity of this proposition, it remains a contentious issue 
in the strategic group literature, due in large to the inability of research to develop conclusive 
evidence either in support or disagreement of the hypothesised relationship between 
strategic groups and rivalry.  The lack of consistent results is most likely the result of a 
variety of different approaches being used to construct strategic groups1 and the fact that 
intraindustry patterns of competition vary greatly, making the existence of groups relatively 
inconsequential in certain industries.  Whilst more studies have found support for the Caves-
Porter hypothesis regarding patterns of rivalry and strategic groups than have refuted it or 
been non-committal, the effectiveness of strategic groups in explaining patterns of rivalry is 
certainly not perfect and therefore this study seeks to pit the strategic groups concept against 
an alternative intraindustry clustering tool, strategic blocks, in a test of their relative utility.   
 
Whereas strategic groups have traditionally been conceptualised according to scope and 
resource commitments (Cool & Schendel, 1987), a more recent approach to the study of 
interfirm dynamics within an industry has emerged in the form of strategic blocks.  Strategic 
blocks are recognised as sets of firms that exhibit denser strategic linkages amongst 
themselves than other firms within the same industry (Garcia-Pont, 1992).  The underlying 
idea behind the strategic blocks concept is that firms that engage in alliances with other firms 
within an industry will take into account these alliances in terms of their competitive strategy.  
The result is that where a group of firms are closely linked through a dense network of 
alliances, they are unlikely to behave in the same way competitively as they would if these 
                                                          
1  The problems associated with strategic group formation are well illustrated in the paper by Nath and 
Gruca (1997) whereby the authors, in an attempt to validate the strategic group concept, use three 
different group construction methods in an attempt to demonstrate that strategic groups are more 
than just a natural grouping in the data (as suggested may often be the case by Barney and 
Hoskisson (1990)). 
alliances did not exist.  The idea that a network of alliances within a cluster of firms creates a 
strategic network has gained acceptance on the basis of work done in the development of 
network theory (Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2002; Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 2000).  And given the 
proliferation of these strategic networks in recent decades, it is entirely plausible that through 
appreciation of these strategic blocks, patterns of rivalry may be better understood.  
However, as yet, no research has effectively utilised the strategic block approach in the study 
of intraindustry rivalry. 
 
In testing the utility of the strategic group and strategic block concepts in explaining patterns 
of rivalry, we have chosen the international airline industry.  The airline industry has been a 
popular choice for previous strategic group studies (e.g. Peteraf, 1993; Smith, Grimm, Wally 
& Young, 1997) because it allows for access to timely data in terms of participants and their 
competitive actions.  From a strategic block perspective, the airline industry is also an 
appropriate industry as airlines can be easily clustered into strategic networks such as the 
Oneworld alliance, the Star alliance and Sky Team making the establishment of strategic 
blocks relatively uncomplicated.  Rivalry remains a difficult construct to measure and rather 
than adopt a multi-dimensional measure, for the purposes of this study we have used a uni-
dimensional measure relating to the level of price discounting (as the most overt 
manifestation of rivalry within this industry). 
 
The primary contribution of this paper is to offer a comparative assessment of the relative 
utility of the strategic group and strategic block rationale in explaining patterns of rivalry at a 
theoretical and empirical level.  To do this, we first introduce a theoretical review and 
comparison of the strategic group and strategic block concepts.  Drawing upon this material, 
we develop our central research question and present our research methods.  The final 
major section of the paper provides the results of the research and our discussion 




Whilst much of the research today in strategy, and indeed much of the focus by practitioners, 
may effectively occur within the resource based view (RBV) of the firm perspective, there 
continues to be an implied focus on ‘fit’ whereby strategy formulation includes the 
deployment of resources and capabilities in a manner that can lead to a competitive 
advantage given the external environment facing the firm.  Understanding this external 
environment therefore becomes a critical element within strategy formulation, and this 
includes an understanding of the different sub-sets of firms and the way that they compete 
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within a particular industry.  To this effect, an appreciation of the different strategic 
groups/strategic blocks that operate within an industry and their effect upon competitive 
behaviours, including rivalry, is a legitimate goal for researchers and practitioners alike.  
 
Strategic Groups and Rivalry 
Developed from the implicit understanding that competition within an industry is not 
homogeneous, the concept of strategic groups was initially identified by Hunt in 1972.  Since 
this time, an economic perspective has largely dominated research and discourse, with the 
focus of empirical studies predominantly geared towards an analytical approach to strategic 
group determination, performance variations between firms, group and competitive dynamics 
(Cool & Schendel, 1988; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1993; Mascarenhas, 1989).  As this study 
is concerned primarily with rivalry, the scope of this paper allows for a review of only the 
most prominent and relatively few works in this particular area, as opposed to a more 
generalist coverage of the development of the strategic group concept.  For broader, critical 
reviews of the strategic group concept, see McGee (1985), McGee and Thomas (1986) or 
Thomas and Venkatramen (1988).  
 
Considerable interest in the strategic groups concept has emanated from the theoretical link 
between group membership and profitability (Caves & Porter, 1977; Porter, 1979).  Central to 
this link is the premise that firms cannot easily switch between strategic groups due to 
mobility barriers, making members of certain groups persistently more profitable than those 
of other groups (Porter, 1979).  Implicit in the concept of mobility barriers is the notion that 
rivalry differs within and between groups, with Caves and Porter (1977) hypothesising that 
rivalrous behaviour between firms within different strategic groups is greater than the rivalry 
witnessed between firms within the same group.  Similarities in competitive posture and 
strategy are expected within each strategic group, with distinct differences in firm-specific 
attributes and strategy evidenced between groups.  Therefore, ‘structural similarities among 
firms predisposes them to respond in similar ways to disturbances from inside or outside the 
group’ (Peteraf, 1993: 520).  It is these similarities amongst firms that encourage tacit 
coordination mechanisms to develop.  Cool & Dierickx (1993) support this view, suggesting 
that similar competitive behaviours of firms within a strategic group emanate from firms’ 
recognition of their mutual dependence within an industry. 
 
Whilst the expectation of rivalry being higher between groups, as opposed to within groups 
has been the normal jumping off point for studies looking at the link between rivalry and 
strategic group membership, the reverse argument has also been made (Smith et al, 1997).  
In essence, differences in terms of resources and interpretation of the competitive 
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environment can make it difficult to predict and coordinate actions with rivals across a 
strategic group (Porter, 1980).  Furthermore, coordination can break down under a number of 
conditions, most notably when there are a large number of competitors within a single group 
(Scherer & Ross, 1990).  Porter (1979) also suggests that the greater the market 
interdependence (the degree to which firms within a group target the same set of customers) 
the greater the rivalry. 
 
To study these alternatives regarding the link between strategic group membership and 
rivalry, there have been a limited number of empirical studied.  In the first of these, Peteraf 
(1993) segmented the US domestic airline industry into those that existed prior to the 
deregulation of the industry and those that constituted new entrants.  The Caves-Porter 
hypothesis was partially supported with prices being 9 percent above a standardised level 
when there were only carriers from a single strategic group operating on a route, versus 7.5 
percent below this level for routes with competitors from different strategic groups.   
 
The other significant strategic group oriented study of the airline industry saw Smith et al 
(1997) assess rivalry from a multi-dimensional perspective whereby rivalry was determined 
by a range of variables including competitive activity, degree of rivalry instigation, proclivity 
toward price cutting, speed of response and tit-for-tat imitation.  Strategic groups were 
determined through a multi-variable cluster analysis technique.  Smith et al (1997) found that 
while competitive actions of firms may be predicted on the basis of strategic group 
membership, there was no evidence of differences in rivalry between groups versus within 
groups. 
 
In examination of strategic groups and rivalry outside of the airline industry, Cool and 
Dierickx (1993) sought to determine the nature of within and between group rivalry, and 
looked at how strategic group dynamics may affect firm profitability.  In analysis of the US 
pharmaceutical industry (1963-1982), the authors determined strategic groups using a mix of 
variables including profitability, concentration, segment interdependence and strategic 
distance.  The findings of this longitudinal study observed rivalry shifting from within group 
rivalry to between group rivalry. 
 
It is reasonable to surmise that the results to date of investigations into the strategic group – 
rivalry relationship are relatively inconclusive, though they do offer the foundation upon which 
further empirical investigation is warranted.  Certainly those questioning the existence of 
strategic groups would seem to be in the minority as the value of strategic groups in 
understanding industry effects has been demonstrated numerous times (e.g. Dranove, 
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Peteraf & Shanley, 1998; Gonzalez-Fidalgo & Ventura-Victoria, 2002).  However, all future 
studies must be mindful of both the way strategic groups are determined and the measures 
used to determine rivalry as the lack of consistent approaches in these areas have been 
highly problematic for the field.  A number of studies have sought to address the continual 
criticism made of strategic group research, how does one define strategic groups (e.g. Nath 
& Gruca, 1997) but there is still little consensus in the area.  Thus, with strategic groups 
unable to adequately explain intraindustry patterns of rivalry, it may be necessary to review 
other intraindustry clustering tools such as strategic blocks. 
 
Strategic Blocks and Rivalry 
In contrast to the substantial research heritage of the strategic group concept, the strategic 
block rationale is still in its infancy.  Strategic blocks are recognised as sets of firms in an 
industry that exhibit denser strategic linkages among themselves than other firms within the 
same industry (Garcia-Pont, 1992).  Such strategic linkages may adopt multiple forms, 
including joint venture agreements, strategic alliances, mergers, acquisitions, technology 
licensing and development arrangements, equity partnerships, and manufacturing, marketing 
and distribution collaborations (Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991).  The concept of strategic blocks 
was first anticipated by Harrigan who termed these formations of strategic linkages as 
‘constellations’ (Harrigan, 1985).  Prior theoretical and empirical research into the realm of 
interorganisational strategic linkages (regardless of form), had, until this time, focused almost 
exclusively on the pre-conditions, formation, management, performance implications and 
economic impact that these strategic linkages had on the industry environment. 
 
The conceptual and empirical value of network theory in discerning the competitive dynamics 
of industrial environments is considered a relatively new addition to strategic management 
research (Thomas & Pollock, 1999).  Prior theoretical and empirical enterprise in network 
theory has largely focussed upon the micro perspective of application in respect to 
organisations and strategy (Madhavan, Koka & Prescott, 1998).  Derived in large from the 
social sciences, network theory additionally allows for the macro examination of the 
opportunities and constraints inherent in a structure of interorganisational relationships, 
establishing a relational approach upon which the conduct and performance of firms can be 
more fully understood (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000; Madhavan, 1996). 
 
Thus far, there have been only two significant empirical studies into the existence and 
operation of strategic blocks.  The first of these by Garcia-Pont as part of his doctoral 
research (see Garcia-Pont, 1992; Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2002; Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991) 
was largely directed toward determining the structure of networks of strategic linkages in 
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selected industries.  This empirical study of strategic blocks in the worldwide automotive and 
European banking industries argues that strategic linkages are formed in response to market 
imperfections for particular resources (Garcia-Pont, 1992).  Garcia-Pont (1992) postulates 
that strategic blocks are an outcome of an individual organisation’s need for access to 
strategic resources required for industry survival, but not held by the single firm.  Rather, the 
collective strategic block represents an accumulation of those scarce and highly valued 
resources and capabilities which are accessible at both an individual and group level and 
which serve to tie individual firms in an industry into a much larger system of exchange 
(Garcia-Pont, 1992).  Strategic blocks can therefore be understood in terms of the resource 
endowments and strategic capabilities of firms, and the nature of competitive interaction 
within the context of the industry environment.  Garcia-Pont’s research did not directly 
address the issue of rivalry, however, by implication, those firms that are tied to each other 
through an alliance structure within a larger system will tend to coordinate their behaviours to 
a greater extent than those outside of the system.  No empirical data was collected to test 
this proposition. 
 
The second study by Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven (2001) examined the development 
and manufacture of RISC microprocessors in relation to technical standard wars between 
participant organisations.  Defining blocks according to horizontally aligned alliance 
relationships, Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven suggest that such competitive arrangements 
represent a new form of rivalry, where firm-to-firm competition is superseded by group-to-
group rivalry.  The authors propose that ‘analysis on the level of the individual players or 
dyads will fail to produce an understanding of the nature of competition shaping the industry’, 
instead proposing that competitive advantage must be understood as ‘not only the result of 
company-based characteristics but also features of the alliance block to which the firm 
belongs’ (Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001: 1-2, italics added).  Concerned with 
governance mechanisms, boundaries, composition and internal structure of alliance blocks, 
the authors determine ‘blocks’ based on the density of strategic alliance relationships 
between firms in the period 1980-1989.  The findings generated from this research, which did 
not directly measure rivalry, indicate the presence of competitive configurations of 
organisations structured around technical standards (Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001).  
Again, whilst there is no empirical data to support any rivalry and strategic blocks 
relationship, the implication within the paper is that firms that are extensively linked (in this 
case because of technical standards within products) coordinate their behaviour, leading to 
lower levels of rivalry between firms within the same alliance block. 
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Thus, unlike the fundamental difficulties associated with strategic group research in terms of 
group determination, strategic block research potentially provides a simplistic approach to 
understanding patterns of rivalry within industries.  This research is therefore concerned with 
the comparative assessment of the strategic group and strategic block concept in 
deciphering patterns of intraindustry rivalry.  To this effect, we set out to answer to following 
research question:   
Are strategic groups or strategic blocks a better predictor of rivalry in the international 
airline industry? 
 
In essence, the strategic group literature would suggest that the level of rivalry will increase 
as the number of strategic groups increase (independently of the number of competitors).  
Within a single strategic group, implicit coordination mechanisms are likely to develop as the 
resource endowments of firms are relatively similar across the critical strategic dimensions.  
As additional groups enter a market, rivalry will increase as there are no coordination 
mechanisms in existence with firms from other groups, and in the case of the airline industry, 
we predicted that the differing resource bases of firms from strategic groups would lead to 
increased competition, whereby this competition reverts to the lowest common denominator 
– price.  Thus, the increase of rivalry can be explained on the basis of differing resource 
endowments across firms. 
 
In comparison, the implication of the two studies completed in the area of strategic blocks is 
that rivalry within a single strategic block will be low due to the interrelationships that exist on 
the basis of the various strategic alliances.  The mutual interdependence of firms in a 
strategic block limits opportunistic behaviour and encourages tacit coordination.  However, 
when there is more than one strategic block within a market, rivalry at a network level is likely 
to occur where one block (network) seeks to compete in a relatively unified manner against 
the other blocks.  In the case of RISC microprocessors Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven 
(2001) found that the competition occurred at the block level in relation to technical 
standards.  In the airline industry we predicted that blocks such as the Oneworld or Star 
alliances would compete in a relatively unified manner as they sought to attract customers 
into their alliance block.  Therefore, whilst increased rivalry at the strategic group level can be 
explained in relation to differing resource endowments, in the case of strategic blocks the 
increase in rivalry can potentially be explained in terms of alliances creating a level of mutual 
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METHODS 
 
The airline industry was chosen for this study on the basis of several considerations.  As 
Peteraf (1993) and Smith et al (1997) attest, participants can be easily identified, with 
subsequent groupings robust to re-examination.  For the creation of strategic blocks there 
are well established and easily identified alliance groupings.  In addition, the competitive 
environment is well recognised (Smith et al, 1997) and there is ready access to accurate and 
timely data through published fares. 
 
Subjects and procedure 
Data from 11 competitive airline routes (ex-Australia) collected over a six month period in 
1998 were included in the study.  Every five days information was collected on the price of all 
airfares on each route, number of carriers, number of strategic groups, and number of 
strategic blocks operating on the route.  
 
Measures 
Rivalry.  Rivalry between strategic groups can manifest itself in a number of ways.  Smith et 
al (1997) recognised this and used multiple measures of rivalry that moved beyond the price 
focus of Peteraf (1993).  However, to cover the full gambit of rivalry manifestations 
contemporary studies would need to consider additional variables such as the offering of 
double frequent flyer points on certain routes, combining hotel and other specials with 
airfares, varying ticket conditions at the same price point, and the lobbying of governments 
by firms to negotiate access rights to foreign ports.  Rather than try to study the multi-
dimensional construct of rivalry, this study restricts itself to considering how price behaviour 
varies according to the number of strategic groups/blocks operating on a set route.  
Specifically, we set out to measure the level of price discounting as the most overt form of 
rivalry in the industry.  Price discounting was calculated by dividing the lowest available fare 
for the route by the highest available economy fare.  The result is a ratio that indicates the 
percentage of fare discounting in operation for the route.  Based on this figure, the lower the 
percentage, the heavier the discounting.  Discussions with airline staff have suggested that 
the full economy fare (as the highest economy fare) is approximately a multiple of the true 
cost of offering a seat on a particular route (accounting for distance, aircraft type, staffing 
costs etc).  The lowest fare therefore represents the extent to which airlines discount below 
the true cost (including both fixed and variable costs) of a seat on a route, and this ensures 
that the level of price discounting can effectively be compared across routes as a measure of 
(price oriented) rivalry.  
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There are a number of potential problems with using the level of fare discounting as a 
measure of rivalry.  Firstly, while the product of an economy airline seat may seem to be 
relatively homogenous (suggesting that the market is relatively homogeneous), the product is 
actually made up of a number of hedonic characteristics.  The full economy fare includes the 
attribute of complete flexibility regarding changing the ticket or receiving a refund, whereas 
the lowest discount economy fare contains numerous conditions and therefore suits a 
different market segment.  The result may be that a large difference between high and low 
fares may simply reflect the fact that airlines on a route have carefully differentiated between 
these different markets and have structured their prices accordingly.  However, as a full 
economy fare is a rough proxy for the true cost of a seat on a route, the question becomes 
why do airlines have to vigorously discount on some routes relative to others to gain custom?  
We suggest that this level of discounting is at least partially a function of the competitive 
dynamics featured on a route which in turn is likely to be affected by the absolute number of 
competitors, the number of strategic groups and the number of strategic blocks. 
 
The second criticism of using the lowest fare over the highest fare ratio is that is allows us to 
only measure rivalry across one segment of the market.  As the lowest fare contains 
numerous conditions including the fact that it cannot be changed without substantial penalty 
once issued, it is only suitable for certain travellers that can commit to particular dates at 
least one month on advance.  Such customers tend to be holiday makers and business 
travellers undertaking specific tasks such as attending conferences and completing training 
courses where the dates are set well in advance.  Thus it is possible that airlines may 
compete vigorously in this market in terms of offering some fares that are set at a very low 
proportion of the true cost of an seat on that route (i.e. they cover little more than the 
marginal cost of one additional customer).  In comparison, there may be far less rivalry in a 
different market segment (such as the equivalent of a seven day advance fare with less 
onerous conditions) on one route relative to others.  Thus, when we discuss rivalry in this 
study we are really referring to the price based rivalry that occurs in just the most price 
conscious market segment. 
 
Number of Strategic Groups.  For the purposes of this study, Porter’s classification of 
strategic groups as ‘a group of firms in an industry following the same or similar strategy 
along the strategic dimensions’ (1980: 129) was employed.  To operationalise this definition, 
airlines were studied according to two dimensions – extent of route structure and ownership 
(private or majority government).  The aim was to capture the differences in the general size 
of airlines to differentiate between the mega-carriers (such as British Airways and United) 
and the mid-sized airlines (such as Malaysian Airlines and Qantas).  For the other dimension, 
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ownership was seen as being important as some airlines are run by governments at a loss 
simply to ensure that the more important tourist income is maximised.  In comparison, 
privately owned carriers are more likely to feel the full weight of economic realities and act 
accordingly (i.e. withdraw from a route or simply not engage in tit-for-tat price rivalry).  Thus 
ownership has a significant effect upon competitive behaviour of an airline, thereby affecting 
the level of rivalry.  We plotted each airline in the sample and found there to be three clear 
clusters (privately owned mega-carriers, privately owned mid-sized carriers and government 
owned smaller carriers). 
 
Whilst the trend for determining strategic groups has been through the use of cluster analysis 
and other multi-dimensional approaches (e.g. Fiegenbaum, Thomas & Tang, 2001; 
Houthoofd & Heene, 1997; Smith et al, 1997) we believe that such complex approaches 
suffer on two counts.  First, the inclusion of numerous (and possibly contradictory) variables 
has the potential to confound any relationships that may exist.  In our eyes, the classic 
example of this was the fact that the relatively simple approach used by Peteraf (1993) to 
classifying groups (pre and post deregulation in the US) and rivalry (price based rivalry) 
produced significant results.  In comparison, the much more complex study (both in terms of 
rivalry and group formation) by Smith et al (1997) in the same industry failed to support or 
refute the Caves-Porter (1977) hypothesis.  Further simple studies, such as that by Nair and 
Kotha (2001) where strategic groups in the Japanese steel industry were simply determined 
on the basis of two types of production technology also produced significant results.  The 
second problem with complex multidimensional approaches to group formation is that if 
managers are to gain any benefit from the strategic group notion, then the concept must be 
able to be applied in a relatively ‘rough and ready’ way.  We can explain performance or 
behavioural differences retrospectively using these complex grouping techniques, however if 
managers are to ever use strategic groups in a predictive way as part of their strategy 
formulation process, then relatively simple strategic group determination techniques will be 
required. 
 
Number of Strategic Blocks.  Strategic blocks were determined according to whether airlines 
were a central part (or somehow affiliated with) either the Oneworld group of airlines or the 
Star Alliance (no airlines in the sample were part of the Sky Team).  Those carriers that were 
not part of either of these two alliances were considered to be part of a third group – the non-
aligned carriers. 
 
Number of Carriers.  For each route, the number of carriers flying at each particular point in 
time was counted.  The number of carriers was seen as being a potentially significantly 
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mediating variable.  It was expected that as the number of carriers on a route increased, so 





Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among study variables are shown in Table 1.  The 
results indicated that all study variables were significantly intercorrelated with each other.  
Number of Carriers displayed a consistently high interrelationship with all of the other 
variables.  This finding supports the argument that Number of Carriers may act as a potential 
confound to the study of Rivalry (level of price discounting).  It should be noted that the 
standard deviations for all study variables were noted to be relatively small. 
 
TABLE 1 




1. 2. 3. 
1. Rivalry (fare discounting) 0.53 
(.11) 
   
2. No. Strategic Groups 2.00 
(.63) 
-.79**   
3. No. Strategic Blocks 3.02 
(1.34) 
-.46** .63**  
4. No. Carriers 2.20 
(.75) 
-.70** .81** .72** 
  
Note - *p<0.05, **p<0.01. 
 
 
The research question set out to examine the relationships between the independent 
variables – the number of strategic groups and the number of strategic blocks - and the level 
of rivalry.  In order to test the relationship, two hierarchical multiple regressions were 
conducted, each with the independent variables entered in a different order.  The regression 
analyses were conducted with variables being entered over 3 steps.  The Number of Carriers 
variable was entered at step 1 in order to control for differences in numbers of airlines 
associated with each route.  Step 2 involved entering number of Strategic Groups for the first 
regression and number of Strategic Blocks for the second regression.  Step 3 involved the 
entry of the independent variable not entered at Step 2. 
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Checking the data against the assumptions of hierarchical regression revealed non-normal 
distributions.  The data was transformed to resolve the issue.  Comparison between 
transformed and non-transformed solutions revealed no major differences so the non-
transformed results are presented here.  All other statistical assumptions were passed. 
 
Overall, the number of Strategic Groups and Strategic Blocks significantly predicted degree 
of (price based) Rivalry [F(3,356) = 216.74, p<0.001] (See Table 2 or Table 3).  The results 
showed that all study variables accounted for approximately 65% of variance in the Rivalry 
variable.  Of this variance approximately 50% was explained using the control variable 
(Number of Carriers) leaving the remaining variance to be explained by the independent 
variables.  As hypothesised, the level of prediction for the independent variables was not 
equal with number of Strategic Blocks accounting for approximately 2% (see Step 3 in Table 
2) [F(1,356) = 14.69, p<0.001] and number of Strategic Groups accounting for approximately 
15%  (see Step 3 in Table 3) [F(1,356) = 145.97, p<0.001].  Given the small degree of 
variance noted in the study variables and the smaller percentage identified after the control 
variable was entered it can be assumed that, although significant, the independent variables 
were associated with relatively small changes in the level of Rivalry.  The predictive ability of 
the independent variables were found to differ as hypothesized with number of Strategic 
Groups being a better predictor (Beta = -.66) of Rivalry than number of Strategic Blocks 
(Beta = .18). 
 
TABLE 2 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression investigating the unique contribution of Strategic 
Blocks (Step 3) 
 
Variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
    
Number of Carriers -0.70** -0.19** -0.30** 
    
Number of Strategic Groups  -0.63** -0.66** 
    
Number of Strategic Blocks   0.18** 
    
R Square .495 .631 .646 
Adjusted R Square .494 .629 .643 
Change in R Square .495 .136 .015 
Change in F 352.07** 131.80** 14.69** 
F 352.07** 306.07** 216.74** 
Note - *p<0.05, **p<0.01, Dependent Variable = Rivalry (fare discounting) 
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TABLE 3 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression investigating the unique contribution of Strategic 
Groups (Step 3) 
 
Variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
    
Number of Carriers -0.70** -0.78** -0.30** 
    
Number of Strategic Blocks  0.10* 0.18** 
    
Number of Strategic Groups   -0.66** 
    
R Square .495 .501 .646 
Adjusted R Square .494 .498 .643 
Change in R Square .495 .006 .145 
Change in F 352.07** 3.95* 145.97** 
F 352.07** 179.46** 216.74** 
Note - *p<0.05, **p<0.01, Dependent Variable = Rivalry (fare discounting) 
 
Investigating the mean level of fare discounting by number of Strategic Groups and number 
of Strategic Blocks demonstrates a linear relationship for Strategic Groups and a non-linear 
relationship for Strategic Blocks.  These results may explain the low beta for Strategic 
Groups in the regression analyses.  A Multivariate ANOVA was also run to evaluate the 
relationship between the independent variables (Strategic Blocks and Strategic Groups) and 
the dependent variable (Rivalry).  Given that there were three levels of each independent 
variable MANOVA was most suitable for a non-normal distributions.  Results indicated a 
significant interaction, F(1,356) = 6.56, p<.05, etasquare = 0.02, rsquare = 0.77.  Comparing 
the interaction with the main effects for Strategic Groups, F(2, 355)=242.35, p<.001, 
etasquare=0.58, and Strategic Blocks, F(2,355)=67.46, p<.001, etasquare=0.28, suggested 
greater differences for levels of Strategic Groups in level of the rivalry.  Post hoc analyses 
indicated that all levels of Strategic Groups and Strategic Blocks variable were significantly 
different from each other.   
 
In summary, these results suggest that each increment of Strategic Blocks and Strategic 
Groups results in a significant change in Rivalry.  Although each increment in Strategic 
Groups has resulted in increases in Rivalry a similar trend was not found for Strategic Blocks 
where the two block condition was associated with the least level of rivalry.  In relation to the 
level of rivalry that could be explained by the Strategic Groups and the Strategic Blocks 
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concept, it was found that Strategic Groups was able to explain a far greater proportion of the 
Rivalry variable than was the case with Strategic Blocks. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results supported the argument that the level of price based rivalry was predicted by 
both strategic groups and strategic blocks, with the former accounting for proportionally more 
of the variance.  These results were identified after the effect for the number of carriers was 
controlled.  Considering the moderately limited period of data collection, the results would 
suggest that the data is relatively robust.  However, the potential for other factors to confound 
the results is significant.  Whereas Porter (1979) suggests that rivalry will increase as the 
number of competitors increases (which was controlled for) the level of rivalry may also be 
affected by the capacity of the route and the passenger mix (i.e. business versus leisure 
travellers).  We were unable to control for these variables due to our inability to obtain this 
data and thus our findings are limited by this fact.  However, the span of the data did control 
for seasonal effects as the data collection process was started in what was the low season 
for most routes ex-Australia, moved through the shoulder season into high and then back 
into shoulder.  While the level of discounting varied across these seasons, the general trend 
of those routes with higher numbers of strategic groups witnessing greater levels of price 
discounting remained. 
 
As anticipated, the results showed both strategic groups and strategic blocks to affect the 
level of price discounting present on a route.  Rivalry is therefore affected by more than 
simply the number of carriers on a route.  The finding that strategic groups was a better 
predictor of rivalry was perhaps a little unexpected.  Our expectation was that the various 
cooperative measures that come with being part of an alliance block would limit competition 
within a block.  Airlines within a strategic block engage in code-sharing, they allow for 
redemption of frequent flyer points on each others’ flights, they share executive lounges and 
they inter-line their services.  Thus it was thought that if a single strategic block operated on 
a route then the benefits of vigorous competition would be minimal and therefore the level of 
price discounting required to gain custom would be relatively limited.  Furthermore, the 
strength of the two major alliance blocks is similar and thus the potential for one block to 
outperform the other alliance block was limited.  Financially, neither block is about to be 
knocked out of the industry and thus we expected fairly strong tacit cooperation where only 
one block operated, limited tacit cooperation where the two alliance blocks operated and 
strong competition when all three strategic blocks were found on the route.   
 
  Page 15 
 
The explanation for strategic blocks having relatively limited effect upon the level of rivalry 
may exist in the strength of the alliances.  Both the Oneworld and the Star Alliance are 
relatively fluid in terms of their membership.  With the exception of around four key players 
each, the alliances have continually accepted new members at around the same rate that 
other airlines have withdrawn from the alliances.  Thus while Vanhaverbeke and 
Noorderhaven (2001) found that firms within alliance blocks closely related to others within 
the block on the basis of a common technological standard, it would seem that airlines in the 
major blocks engage in alliances out of necessity (to offer more services and route options at 
lower cost) at a very minimal level and never truly identify with the alliance as a coherent 
group.  It was observed that the alliances were used more as a last resort where one airline 
did not fly into a particular location, but wherever possible, airlines made decisions that would 
benefit themselves and generally did not account for the effect that their decision may have 
upon another alliance member.  For example, Qantas and Cathay Pacific are both members 
of the Oneworld alliance.  They both cover a number of routes between Australia and Hong 
Kong, however, almost none of their flights between these two locations include code-share 
arrangements.  Passengers flying with Cathay Pacific from Hong Kong that need to fly to 
other parts of Australia from their initial landing point will use Qantas in much the same way 
that passengers from Australia flying into other parts of China will use Cathay Pacific.  
However, the level of cooperation seems to be minimal, except where one airline can use the 
other to offer further services.  The exception to this minimal level of engagement seemed to 
occur where one airline had a significant equity stake in another.  Thus Qantas and British 
Airways truly do interline their services and undertake numerous code-share flights.  
Similarly, Ansett’s route expansion never included routes that were already covered by Air 
New Zealand (who held a 49 percent stake in the Australian carrier). 
 
At a theoretical level, the results would suggest that if strategic blocks are going to have an 
effect upon the strategic decisions that a firm makes, and in the process affect the level of 
rivalry, then the alliances must be more than just a loosely affiliated group that do little more 
than coordinate their activities at the barest possible level.  The theoretical underpinnings 
associated with strategic blocks continue to make logical sense, however, for firms to act in 
ways that account for their alliance partners, then the alliance must have the potential to 
affect the performance of the firms in a meaningful way.  In the case of airlines this was seen 
in the way that the behaviours of those airlines that were linked through equity stakes tended 
to be far more cooperative than those airlines that were simply part of the alliance blocks.  
Where this was the case, the performance benefits of being part of the alliance were 
obviously relatively limited (especially for the smaller airlines) and it is for this reason that so 
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many of them have withdrawn from the alliance blocks over the years.  Therefore, the weak 
ties associated with the strategic blocks in this case probably go a long way to explaining the 
relatively weak effect that strategic blocks had upon the level of rivalry. 
 
Instead, it would seem that strategic groups can better help understand the patterns of rivalry 
in this case.  The RBV perspective, as the dominant underlying theory for determining 
strategic groups, sees strategic group formation occurring on the basis of resource 
endowments and competitive scope (Cool & Schendel, 1987).  The RBV suggests that firm 
strategies will build on (and thus be a reflection) of a firm’s resource endowments and this 
certainly can be seen in the airline industry.  The very large carriers that are privately owned 
try hard to limit the amount of price based competition where possible.  They seek the 
business traveller, offer frequent flyer programs and in general, try to offer superior value to 
the extent that they are not drawn into price wars.  In comparison, airlines with few 
resources, and thus unable to provide this level of superior service, have few opportunities to 
compete along any dimension other than price.  This is particularly pronounced in the case of 
airlines that are government owned, as these airlines are generally relatively resource poor 
and they often have goals that do not include profit maximisation.  Consequently, the more 
strategic groups on a particular route, the more diverse the firms are that compete on that 
route and thus (due to the high fixed cost nature of the airline industry) the more propensity 
there is for all airlines to get drawn into heavy price discounting.  In essence, our results 
support the previous theoretical work done by Caves and Porter (1977) in terms of tacit 
coordination mechanisms developing between firms with similar competitive positioning, and 
also the work of Cool and Dierickx (1993) who suggest that mutual dependence tends to lead 
to predictability in terms of rivalrous behaviour among firms within an industry. 
 
However, despite the significance of these results, future research should aim to clarify a 
range of questions that arise out of these findings.  Is a similar effect likely in other industries 
(or other parts of the airline industry)?  Another difficulty in this arena of research is ensuring 
that the measures of strategic groups and strategic blocks are clearly defined and are clearly 
independent concepts.  We would certainly recommend that the creation of strategic blocks 
is done on the basis of alliances and other cooperative behaviours that signal true 
interdependence of alliance members.  In relation to strategic groups, the greatest criticism 
lies in relation to the way that groups are formed.  Alternative conceptualisations of strategic 
groups may need to be considered.  Further study into other confounding factors may prove 
an insightful exercise in addressing the variations in methodology currently seen in the 
literature.  In addition, the current study happened to focus on a period of relative stability in 
the chosen travel routes, yet future studies may also benefit from the inclusion of larger 
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variations in numbers of strategic groups and strategic blocks.  Such a study may ultimately 
test the range of association between such entities and the level of competitive pricing.  In 
order to clearly avoid the possibility of interconnecting our measures of strategic groups and 
strategic blocks we used clear and simple definitions of both terms.  Although this may 
address issues of variable independence (mentioned earlier) is has the effect of reducing 
some of the generalisability of the findings.  On the other hand, we were able to distinguish 
an important effect that is worthy of further study. 
 
Overall, this study adds to the body of literature regarding intraindusty patterns of competition 
in two important ways.  Firstly, it studies the role of strategic blocks in relation to rivalry.  The 
lack of work done in relation to strategic blocks including the fact that no empirical research 
has been done in relation to rivalry makes this an important contribution.  This contribution is 
still important even though the strategic blocks were determined on the basis of relatively 
weak ties, a factor that may have affected our findings.  Secondly, the predictive ability of 
strategic blocks was tested relative to strategic groups in relation to the rivalry construct.  
Consistent with the expected results and other studies, strategic groups were found to be 
important (e.g. Dranove, Peteraf & Shanley, 1998), with strategic groups explaining 
considerably more variance in the level of price based rivalry relative to the concept of 
strategic blocks. 
 
  Page 18 
REFERENCES: 
 
Barney, J.& Hoskisson, R.  (1990).  ‘Strategic groups: Untested assertions and research 
proposals’, Managerial and Decision Economics, 11, 187-198. 
Caves, R., & Porter, M. (1977). From entry barriers to mobility barriers: Conjectural decisions 
and contrived deterrence to new competition. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 91, 
241-262. 
Cool, K. & Dierickx, I. (1993). Rivalry, strategic groups and firm profitability. Strategic 
Management Journal, 14, 47-59. 
Cool, K., & Schendel, D. (1987). Strategic group formation and performance: The case of the 
US pharmaceutical industry, 1963-1982. Management Science, 33(9), 1102-124. 
Cool, K., & Schendel, D. (1988). Performance differences among strategic group members. 
Strategic Management Journal, 9, 207-223. 
Dranove, D., Peteraf, M. & Shanley, M. (1998). Do strategic groups exist? An economic 
framework for analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 19, 1029-1044. 
Fiegenbaum, A., & Thomas, H. (1993). Industry and strategic group dynamics: Competitive 
strategy in the insurance industry, 1970-84. Journal of Management Studies, 30, 69-
105. 
Fiegenbaum, A., Thomas, H. and Tang, M. (2001). Linking hypercompetition and strategic 
group theories: Strategic maneuvering in the US insurance industry. Managerial and 
Decision Economics, 22, 265-279. 
Garcia-Pont, C. (1992). Strategic Linkages Within an Industry: The Emergence of Strategic 
Blocks. Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Massachusetts; US. 
Garcia-Pont, C. & Nohria, N.  (2002). Local versus global mimetism: The dynamics of 
alliance formation in the automobile industry. Strategic Management Journal, 23, 307-
321. 
Gonzalez-Fidalgo, E. & Ventura-Victoria, J. (2002). How much do strategic groups matter? 
Review of Industrial Organization, forthcoming. 
Gulati, R., Nohria, N., & Zaheer, A. (2000). Strategic networks. Strategic Management 
Journal, 21, 203-215. 
Harrigan, K. (1985). Strategies for Joint Ventures. MA; US: Lexington Books. 
Houthoofd, N. & Heene, A. (1997). Strategic groups as subsets of strategic scope groups in 
the Belgian brewing industry. Strategic Management Journal, 18, 653-666. 
Madhavan, R. (1996). Strategic Flexibility and Performance in the Global Steel Industry. 
Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh; US. 
Madhavan, R., Koka, B., & Prescott, J. (1998). Networks in transition: How industry events 
(re)shape interfirm relationships. Strategic Management Journal, 19, 439-459. 
Mascarenhas, B. (1989). Strategic group dynamics. Academy of Management Journal, 32(2), 
333-352. 
 
  Page 19 
McGee, J. (1985). Strategic groups: A bridge between industry structure and strategic 
management? In H. G. Thomas, D. (Ed.), Strategic Marketing and Management (pp. 
293-313): John Wiley & Sons. 
McGee, J., & Thomas, H. (1986). Strategic groups: Theory, research and taxonomy. 
Strategic Management Journal, 7, 141-160. 
Nair, A. & Kotha, S. (2001). Does group membership matter? Evidence from the Japanese 
steel industry. Strategic Management Journal, 22, 221-235. 
Nath, D. & Gruca, T. S.  (1997). Convergence across alternative methods for forming 
strategic groups. Strategic Management Journal, 18, 745-760. 
Nohria, N., & Garcia-Pont, C. (1991). Global strategic linkages and industry structure. 
Strategic Management Journal, 12, 105-124. 
Peteraf, M. (1993). Intra-industry structure and the response toward rivals. Managerial and 
Decision Economics, 14, 519-528. 
Porter, M. E. (1979). The structure within industries and companies' performance. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 214-227. 
Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive Strategies. New York: The Free Press. 
Scherer, F. & Ross, D. (1990). Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 
Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. 
Smith, K. G., Grimm, C. M., Wally, S. & Young, G.  (1997). Strategic groups and rivalrous 
firm behaviour: Toward a reconciliation. Strategic Management Journal, 18, 149-157. 
Thomas, H., & Pollock, T. (1999). From I-O economics' S-C-P paradigm through strategic 
groups to competence-based competition: Reflections on the puzzle of competitive 
strategy. British Journal of Management, 10, 127-140. 
Thomas, H., & Venkatraman, N. (1988). Research on strategic groups: Progress and 
prognosis. Journal of Management Studies, 25(6), 537-555. 
Vanhaverbeke, W., & Noorderhaven, N. (2001). Competition between alliance blocks: The 
case of the RISC microprocessor technology. Organization Studies, 22(1), 1-30. 
 
  Page 20 
 
Other Titles in the Graduate School of Business 
Working Paper Series 
 
94.01 Nowak, M and Whiteley, A, New Strategies to Develop ‘Real’ Engagement by 
Students with the Learning of the Knowledge and Skills Required for 
International Competitiveness. 
 
95.01 Travaglione, T, Pinto, D and Cacioppe, R, Employee Share Plans:  Recent 
Industrial Relations and Taxation Developments. 
 
95.02 Whiteley, A, Levantard, M and Anderson, P, Critical Thinking/Questioning 
Skills a Meta-Model for Cognitive Development in Management Education. 
 
95.03 Cacioppe, R and Bedford, R, Evaluation of a Participative Change Program 
Over Two Years. 
 
95.04 Travaglione, T and Williams, P, The Move to Individualism by The Western 
Australian Education Department. 
 
95.05 Firns, I, Travaglione, A, and Fink, S, Employee Commitment in Westrail. 
 
95.06 Clifford, P and Evans, R, Corporate Governance:  A Question of 
Independence 
 
95.07 Silcox, S, Cacioppe, R and Soutar, G, Quality Sub-Cultures and Their 
Influence on Change Interventions 
 
96.01 Whiteley, A, McCabe, M, and Savery, L.  Preliminary Findings on Waterside 
Workers’ Responses to the role of Unions following the 1991 Enterprise 
Based Agreement. 
 
96.02 Whiteley, A, McCabe, M, and Savery, L.  Human Resources on the 
Waterfront: Managing History 
 
96.03 Whiteley, A.  Report on a preliminary investigation into the need and support 
for a (tentatively named) director’s development centre 
 
97.01 Whiteley, A, McCabe, M, and Savery, L. Trust and Communication 
Development Needs: An Australian Waterfront Study 
 
97.03 Cacioppe, R.  An Integrated Model and Approach for the Design of Effective 
Leadership Development Programs 
 
97.04 McCabe, M. & Nowak, M.  The Impact of Baby Boomers’ Longevity:  Are 
There Implications for Boards of Directors 
 
98.01 Whiteley, A., McCabe, M., Buoy, L., Howie, F., Klass, D., Latham, J., Bickley, 
M. & Luckeenarain, L.  Planning the Qualitative Research Interview. 
98.02 Nowak, M. J. The Role of Information in Internal Labour Markets. 
 
 
  Page 21 
99.01 Stockwell, C. & Nowak, M. An Application of National Competition Policy: 
Parking Services, City of Perth. 
 
00.01 Dumont, E. & Cacioppe, R.  Leadership Directions for Non-Profit Boards of 
Management  
 
00.02 Whiteley, A. Grounded Research: A Modified Grounded Theory for the  
 Business Setting 
 
00.03 Whiteley, A. & Wood, E.  Decision Making and Decision Taking: GSS and 
Complex Adaptive Systems Theory 
 
01.01 Niki Lukviarman. Key Characteristics of Corporate Governance:  The Case of 
Indonesia. 
 
01.02 Nowak, M.J. & McCabe, M.  Information Costs and the Role of the  
 Independent Corporate Director 
 
01.03 Galvin, P.  Product modularity and the contextual factors that determine its 
use as a strategic tool. 
 
02.01 Whiteley, A. Rigour in Qualitative Research. 
 
  Page 22 
 






































For further information on this discussion paper series please contact: 
 
 
Ms Judy Gaebler, Secretary to the Director 
Graduate School of Business, Curtin Business School 
Curtin University of Technology 
GPO Box U1987, Perth, Western Australia 6001 
 
 
Fax:  61 8 9266 3368  Telephone: 61 8 9266 3366 
 
 
